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 = 123; 148; 28), children observed a video in which two speakers offered alternative labels for unfamiliar
objects. In Experiment 1, 3- to 5-year-olds endorsed the label given by a speaker who had previously labeled familiar objects
accurately, rather than that given by a speaker with a history of inaccurate labeling, even when the inaccurate speaker erred
only while blindfolded. In Experiments 2 and 3, 3- to 7-year-olds showed no preference for the label given by a previously
inaccurate but blindfolded speaker, over that given by a second inaccurate speaker with no obvious excuse for erring. Children
based their endorsements on speakers’ history of accuracy or inaccuracy irrespective of the speakers’ information access at the




Both children and adults rely on others to provide
information about the social and physical world. Even
well-intentioned speakers can be wrong, and so a critical
task for the listener is to decide when to accept a piece
of new information, and when to discard it as probably
inaccurate. Without this ability, we run the risk of
accepting false information as true. How do children
tackle this challenge?
One source of information about whether a speaker is
giving accurate information is that speaker’s history of
accuracy or inaccuracy, and several researchers have
demonstrated children’s sensitivity to this variable
(Birch, Vauthier & Bloom, 2007; Brousseau-Liard &
Birch, 2007; Jaswal, McKercher & Vanderborght, 2008;
Jaswal & Neely, 2007; Koenig, Clément & Harris, 2004;
Koenig & Harris, 2005; Koenig & Woodward, 2007).
In these studies, children typically observe a video in
which two adult speakers name familiar objects,
although in some studies dolls or pictured adults have
been used as speakers. One speaker consistently names
the objects correctly (e.g. ‘it’s a ball’) while the other
consistently names them incorrectly (e.g. ‘it’s a dog’). In
this way, one speaker builds a history of accuracy, and
the other of inaccuracy. At test, children observe as the
two speakers offer conflicting novel labels for an unfamiliar
object (e.g. ‘it’s a fendle’, ‘it’s a blicket’), or give the same
novel label to two different unfamiliar objects. Four-year-
olds, and sometimes 3-year-olds, consistently endorse
the label provided by the speaker with a history of accurate
naming. Children at both ages are also sensitive to an
explicit declaration of ignorance, endorsing the label
provided by a speaker with a history of correct naming
over one provided by a speaker who clamed ignorance
about the labels of the familiar objects (Koenig & Harris,
2005; Sabbagh & Baldwin, 2001).
Although results using this procedure consistently
show that children use speakers’ histories of relative
accuracy to determine from which speaker to accept new
information, it remains unclear exactly what children




. (2007) point out that the results can be interpreted
in different ways. One is that children make mentalistic
interpretations, inferring that the accurate and inaccurate
speakers differ in their knowledge about the domain in
question. The other is that children generalize simply on
the basis of the speakers’ outputs, just as they could if
listening to speaking clocks, for example, one of which
had a history of telling the time accurately and the other
inaccurately. Listeners could learn to ‘distrust’ the in-
accurate clock without making inferences about its




., while admitting that the
evidence remains unclear, lean towards the mentalistic
interpretation, citing other evidence that young children
seem to make mentalistic interpretations of speakers’
output. For example, they treat a human speaker who
mislabels a familiar object differently from an audio-
speaker (Koenig & Echols, 2003).
Similarly, Harris and colleagues argue for a mentalistic
interpretation of children’s inclination to learn from a
previously accurate speaker in preference to a previously
inaccurate one. Harris and colleagues interpret their
findings in terms of ‘selective trust’, and by this they
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mean something more than the kind of trust we might
show in a reliable clock. For example, Harris (2007) states,
‘. . . selective trust almost certainly calls for different
mental attributions to the two informants’ (p. 137). To
date there is no convincing evidence to justify this assertion.
A strong test of whether or not children apply mentalistic
reasoning to predict speakers’ future reliability is to find
out whether or not they take into account the speaker’s
input to interpret the significance of inaccurate output.
We made such a test in the present research. Children
observed a speaker who was poorly informed through
wearing a blindfold, and thus had good reason for making
errors. Children were told explicitly that the blindfolded
speaker could not see. At test, the blindfold was removed,
and children were probed to determine whether they
excused the inaccurate speaker and endorsed her sub-
sequently presented label. If  they did, this would provide
strong evidence that mentalistic reasoning is involved




We compared the performance of children in two groups.
One group received history trials like those used by
previous researchers, in which two speakers provided
conflicting labels for familiar objects. Over three trials,
one speaker was consistently correct, and the other was
consistently incorrect for no obvious reason. For children
in the second group, the inaccurate speaker wore a
blindfold during the naming of  familiar objects. All
children then had identical test trials with both speakers
able to see: The previously inaccurate speaker and the
previously accurate speaker provided conflicting novel
names for a novel object, and children were asked to
endorse one or the other speaker’s label.
Children in the first condition should selectively endorse
the previously accurate speaker’s label, consistent with
the published findings. In contrast, in the blindfold
condition, if  children considered the reasons for the
speaker’s error, they would show no preference for either
speaker. Once the blindfold has been removed, the
unreliable speaker no longer has any reason to err, so
should be able to provide an accurate label. On the other
hand, if  children make judgments based on speakers’
output only, irrespective of the circumstances, then there
would be no difference between the two conditions
and children would again endorse the label given by the
previously accurate speaker.
For children to excuse the blindfolded speaker, they
must understand how the blindfold limits the speaker’s
view. This understanding appears to be in place by 18
months of age, and possibly as young as 12 months:
Infants follow the gaze of an actor less often if  the actor
is wearing a blindfold than if the actor can see (e.g. Brooks
& Meltzoff, 2002; D’Entremont & Morgan, 2006). As
the youngest participants in Experiment 1 were over the
age of 3 years, it was expected that all participants would
have the necessary understanding of blindfolds. As an
additional precaution, when the experimenter drew the
child’s attention to the speaker’s blindfold, she stated
explicitly that the blindfolded speaker could not see:
Children were not required to make that inference for
themselves.
Importantly, in our procedure the blindfolded speaker
could not be considered irresponsible for making a guess
about the identity of an unseen object: The rules of the
game demanded that both speakers took turns to say







In total 123 children participated. Seventy-two children




 = 3;11, range 3;3
to 4;5) and 51 (22 girls) were in reception, their first year




 = 4;9, range 4;3 to 5;4). All children
in this and subsequent experiments attended schools serving
predominantly white working- and middle-class areas of




Five video clips were created, corresponding to three
history trials and two test trials. Each clip showed the
experimenter (Nurmsoo) place an object on the table
between two actors. On history trials, these objects were
familiar: A cup (labeled as a cup and a dog), a book
(labeled as a book and a chair), and a shoe (labeled as a
shoe and a ball). On test trials, the objects were unfamiliar:
A white and red hinged object (labeled as a grimmel and
a terber), and a blue plastic object made of multiple
tubes (labeled as a blicket and a fendle). A scarf was
used as a blindfold. The objects in the clips were presented




Children received first a Warm up, followed by three
History trials and two Test trials. Participants were
randomly assigned to either the Seeing or Blindfold con-
ditions, which differed in the History trials: In the Blindfold
condition, the consistently inaccurate speaker wore a
blindfold while naming the familiar objects, while in the





, the experimenter introduced the task,
and showed children the objects used as props, without
naming them. Children were shown that the scarf could
be used as a blindfold, and were invited to try it on. The
experimenter drew children’s attention to both speakers,
and for children in the Blindfold condition only, explicitly





, all children observed two speakers
providing conflicting labels for three familiar objects. In
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the Blindfold condition, the inaccurate speaker wore the
scarf as a blindfold. Apart from this, the history trials in
the two conditions were identical. All video clips showed
the experimenter first placing a familiar object on the
table. The correspondence between the object on video
and its real counterpart was explicitly mentioned. On the
video, the experimenter turned to each speaker in turn









 think it’s a book/chair’. This phrasing of
questions and responses allowed the blindfolded speaker
to behave in a reasonable manner within the constraints
of the game, but without the inaccurate speaker in either
condition explicitly expressing uncertainty. In all cases,
children were asked to repeat what each of the speakers
had said, and what the object was really called. If children
did not recall accurately, the video was played up to two
more times, as required.
The inaccurate speaker (male or female) was counter-
balanced between participants, and was not shown on





 had the same structure as the History
trials: The experimenter on video placed a novel object
on the table, children’s attention was explicitly drawn to
the correspondence between the object on video and its
real counterpart, and the two speakers provided con-
flicting labels. For children in both conditions, neither
speaker now wore a blindfold. For children in the Seeing
condition, this was no different from the History trials.
For children in the Blindfold condition, however, this
change was explicitly mentioned: ‘Look, s/he’s not wearing
the scarf over her/his eyes any more!’
Children were asked to repeat both words as on the
History trials, and once they did this successfully, the
experimenter said, for example, ‘He called it a blicket,
and she called it a fendle. So what is it? Is it a blicket, or
a fendle?’ The order of novel words used in this forced-
choice test question corresponded to the order in which
they were heard on the video. Both the order of presentation
of the two novel objects and the label used by the inaccurate
speaker were counterbalanced.




. They were asked, ‘One of these two people
kept saying the wrong thing! Who kept saying the wrong
thing?’ followed by an open ended ‘How come?’ Only
children who correctly identified the inaccurate speaker
were included in the final analysis. Eight nursery and




On each of the two test trials, children received a point
if  they endorsed the word provided by the previously
accurate speaker. Results are summarized in Table 1. All
comparisons to chance were calculated against the
chance distribution.
In the Seeing condition, children in both the 3- to 4- and
the 4- to 5-year-old groups endorsed the word used by





































Koenig & Harris, 2005), children were sensitive to the
speakers’ history of accuracy or inaccuracy and preferred
to learn from the previously accurate speaker.
In the Blindfold condition, if  children considered the
reasons for the inaccurate speaker’s errors, they should
be more likely than those in the Seeing condition to
endorse the inaccurate speaker’s word for the novel
object. However, in the 4- to 5-year-old group, children
still preferentially endorsed the word used by the accurate














< .05. Children in the 3- to 4-year-old group were no















tantly, children performed no differently in the Blindfold

















was no evidence that children took into account the
circumstances explaining the unreliable speaker’s errors.
Instead, children appeared to rely solely on the speakers’
history of accuracy or inaccuracy.
Despite failing to consider the speaker’s blindfold in
their endorsement of the new word labels, children did
understand how the blindfold affected the speaker’s
familiar object naming. When asked why the inaccurate
speaker made errors in naming familiar objects, children
in the Blindfold condition spontaneously cited the blind-
fold: Of children who provided a response to this final
question, 75% of 24 4- to 5-year-old children and 43%
of 28 3- to 4-year-old children referred to the blindfold
or to the fact that the inaccurate speaker could not see.
In contrast, children in the Seeing condition, who were
given no obvious reason for the inaccurate speaker’s
errors, often had no spontaneous response. The remaining
children provided various answers (e.g. ‘because she
wasn’t allowed to say it’; ‘because he was being funny’).
Table 1 Experiment 1: Frequency of endorsement of previously accurate speaker’s label over two trials, by age and condition
Age group Condition
Number of times previously accurate 
speaker’s label endorsed
Mean (SD)0 1 2
Nursery 3–4 years Seeing 2 18 12 1.31 (0.59)
Blindfold 5 19 8 1.09 (0.64)
Reception 4–5 years Seeing 1 9 14 1.54 (0.59)
Blindfold 3 10 11 1.33 (0.70)
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None of the children in the Seeing condition cited a failure
to see the object as a possible reason for the speaker’s error.
These findings suggest that when children used a
speaker’s history of accuracy, they did not reason about
how his or her input might be affecting the accuracy of
the output. Rather, children appeared to consider only
the speaker’s output. An alternative possibility, however,
is that in the Blindfold condition there was no good
reason to rely on the previously inaccurate speaker, whose
reliability was unknown, given the positive evidence
that the accurate speaker was reliable. We explore this




Children entered a single condition similar to the
Blindfold condition of Experiment 1, except that the
accurate speaker was replaced by a second inaccurate
speaker who had no obvious reason for erring. On test
trials children had to choose whether to endorse the
novel label given by a previously inaccurate speaker with
no excuse, or a previously inaccurate speaker who had
been wearing a blindfold. We also included an older
group of children, about whom there could be no doubt
that they understood clearly how the blindfold would
impact the inaccurate speaker’s ability to correctly






A total of 148 children participated. Fifty-six children




 = 3;11, range 3;6 to 4;5; 29





= 5;0, range 4;6 to 5;5; 23 girls), and 44









Five video clips were created, following the structure of
the clips used in Experiment 1 but using two new actors,
one male and one female, and different familiar objects:
A ball (labeled as a mug and a plate), a hat (labeled as





The procedure and counterbalancing followed that of
the Blindfold condition in Experiment 1, with the
exception that both speakers provided incorrect labels
for the familiar objects. On test trials, neither speaker
was blindfolded, and children’s attention was drawn to
this change in the same way as in Experiment 1. There
was no final memory check question for the two younger
groups of children, but the oldest group was asked why




On each of the two test trials, children received a point
if  they endorsed the word provided by the previously
blindfolded speaker. Results are summarized in Table 2.
If children excused the previously blindfolded speaker’s
errors, they should preferentially endorse his or her
labels. However, performance by all age groups was no
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 = 44) = 0.50, for 6- to 7-year-
olds, all non-significant. Children did not consider the
circumstances explaining the inaccurate speaker’s errors,
but instead relied solely on the speakers’ history of
inaccuracy. Incidentally, had children ‘stigmatized’ the
previously blindfolded speaker, they would have shown
a preference for the other speaker on test trials. There
was no sign of this.
The oldest group of children frequently explained the
speaker’s errors with reference to the blindfold: 82% of
children cited the inability to see as the reason for the
errors, while the remaining children provided unclassifiable
responses (e.g. ‘She didn’t know the right answers’).
In the final experiment we considered one further
possible explanation: The blindfolded speaker was of
unknown reliability. Perhaps children needed positive
evidence that the blindfolded speaker was accurate when





In Experiment 3, children watched the same video as in
Experiment 2, with an opening scene showing both
speakers providing correct information when not wearing a
blindfold. One speaker then donned a blindfold and
understandably made errors naming familiar objects,
while the other inexplicably named the familiar objects
inaccurately. In the initial scene, we established both
speakers’ accuracy in a related domain: The function of




 We are grateful to Patricia Brosseau-Liard for suggesting this
manipulation.
Table 2 Experiment 2: Frequency of endorsement of pre-
viously blindfolded speaker’s label over two trials, by age and
condition
Age group
Number of times child endorsed 
label  from previously 
blindfolded speaker
0 1 2
Nursery, 3–4 yrs 10 36 10
Reception, 4–5 yrs 10 28 10
Year 2, 6–7 yrs 10 21 13
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speakers’ history on listeners’ subsequent learning from
them has confirmed that children generalize between
functions and object names in both directions from



















The procedure of Experiment 2 was used, with an initial
clip added before the history trials showing the experi-
menter placing a book on the table, and asking each of
the speakers in turn, ‘What do you think this is for?’
Both speakers replied, ‘I think it’s for reading.’ The
history trials and the rest of the procedure were identical




Six children endorsed the previously blindfolded speaker
on both trials, five never endorsed the previously
blindfolded speaker, and the remaining 17 children used
the blindfolded speaker’s word once out of the two trials.
As in Experiment 2, performance was no different from















showing no preference for the label offered by the previ-
ously blindfolded speaker. The results of Experiment 2
seem not to be due to children’s lack of evidence about
the blindfolded speaker’s accuracy when not blindfolded.
As before, children did understand how the blindfold
explained the blindfolded speaker’s errors: of  the 24
children who provided spontaneous responses, 83% cited
the inability to see as the reason for the blindfolded speaker’s
errors, while 17% provided unclassifiable responses (e.g.
‘he thought that round thing was a brush’).
 
General discussion and conclusions
 









., 2004; Koenig & Harris,
2005) that children take into account a speaker’s past
history of accuracy, endorsing the label given by a previously
accurate speaker over one given by a previously inaccurate
speaker when there was no obvious circumstantial
explanation for the inaccuracy (Experiment 1). Children
showed the selective trust in previously accurate
speakers as in the published literature. Our interest was
in whether this behavior reflects attention to the speaker’s




 the speaker was
inaccurate. We found no evidence that they do.
In Experiment 1, children were no less likely to endorse
the label offered by a previously accurate speaker when
the inaccurate speaker was blindfolded at the time of
making errors than when there was no obvious circum-
stantial excuse. In Experiments 2 and 3, when both
speakers were inaccurate, children still failed to show
any preference for the one whose previous inaccuracy
could be excused in terms of inadequate information
(nor any preference for the speaker who had been able
to see throughout). Failure to excuse inaccuracies that
occurred while blindfolded occurred even when the
speaker had proved accurate before donning the blindfold
(Experiment 3). The results of  all three experiments
suggest that children attended only to accuracy of past
output when predicting a speaker’s likely future reliability.
Despite this, when asked to explain the blindfolded
speaker’s inaccuracy, children often cited his or her inability
to see, suggesting that they were sensitive to the blindfolded
speaker’s input conditions when explaining his or her
output errors.
We consider three possible explanations. One is that
children of the ages we tested do not make mentalistic
interpretations of speakers’ accuracy or inaccuracy,
despite understanding that inaccuracy can occur if  the
speaker is blindfolded. Perhaps explaining why inaccuracy
occurred and predicting future reliability draw on different
processes, and children do not integrate the two to see
the implications of one for the other. Predictions about
longer term reliability are based only on output, while
explanations for current inaccuracies draw on relevant
input or lack of it. Such disjointed reasoning is plausible
for 3- and 4-year-olds with limited information processing
capacity: They would err on the side of caution by
avoiding learning from a previously inaccurate speaker
irrespective of circumstances, or from a currently poorly
informed one. In each case, they need attend to only one
variable, either input or output, rather than both. Such
an account is less plausible for 6- to 7-year-olds, however:
These older children, who should be well practiced in
mental state reasoning, did not excuse the blindfolded
speaker.
A second, more plausible, possibility is that children
of the ages we tested can make mentalistic interpretations
of speakers’ accuracy or inaccuracy, but fail to do so in
the typical procedure used in our studies reported above
and in the published research. Importantly, in research
using different procedures, 3- and 4-year-olds did excuse
a speaker’s past inaccuracy when it was explained by
limited information access (Nurmsoo & Robinson, 2007,
March, 2007, October). This evidence also argues against
the first possibility considered above. For example, in
one procedure (Nurmsoo & Robinson, 2007, March),
children aimed to identify a hidden toy in collaboration
with an informant. Three- and 4-year-olds tended to
ignore a currently well-informed informant who was
previously inaccurate despite having full information,
consistent with Experiment 1 above and the published
studies on selective trust (e.g. Koenig & Harris, 2005).
However, contrary to our findings above, children did
believe a currently well-informed informant whose past
 46 Erika Nurmsoo and Elizabeth J. Robinson
 
© 2008 The Authors. Journal compilation © 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
 
inaccuracies arose from inadequate information access,
for example because she had only felt a toy and then
misidentified its color. It seems, then, that young children
can take into account an informant’s relevant input when
deciding whether or not to excuse past inaccuracies. Why
did they apparently fail to do so in the three experiments
reported above?
Communicative and social cues necessary to engage
mentalistic reasoning may be missing from the typical
task, or the absence of such cues may direct children not
to engage mentalistic reasoning. What might such cues
be? Csibra and Gergely (2005) argue that when adults
intend to pass on to children generalizable semantic
knowledge such as the names or functions of objects,
they provide clear cues that they are about to engage in
such pedagogic communication, by making eye contact
with the potential learner and establishing joint reference
to the teaching context. Young children, they argue, are
particularly sensitive to such cues. We might infer, then,
that they are particularly thrown when the expected cues
do not occur, as they do not in the procedure typically
used in the published studies. Although Csibra and
Gergely do not consider situations involving more than
one adult, the expectation might be that onlookers
would react to errors with surprise, correct them, or in
some other way indicate to the child listener that false
information had been conveyed by a speaker who was
apparently fully informed. Yet in the typical video procedure,
the inaccurate speakers’ errors pass without reaction
from the other adults. Under these socially odd circum-
stances, when people behave mechanically, perhaps
children focus only on accuracy of output to predict
future output, just as they could for a machine.
The implication is, then, that the typical manner in
which a speaker is rendered unreliable, or untrustworthy,
in the published literature leads children to make gener-
alizations based on accuracy of speakers’ output only. In
these procedures, mistrust occurs whether speakers’
inaccuracy arises from longer term, cross-situational
unreliability, or is due to temporary circumstances that
no longer hold.
The third possibility, also plausible, and perhaps the most
interesting, is that the discrepancy in results between our
Experiments 1, 2 and 3, along with the published studies
such as Koenig and Harris (2005), and the work of
Nurmsoo and Robinson summarized above, is due not
to the differences in communicative cues between the
two procedures, but rather to the content of the information
being conveyed. Perhaps children are particularly cautious
when they are offered generalizable, semantic knowledge
such as the names or functions of novel objects (as in the
published studies and in our Experiments 1, 2, and 3), but
less cautious when they are offered epistemic knowledge
such as which object happens to be in a container at a
particular moment in time (as in Nurmsoo & Robinson,
2007, March and 2007, October). Under this explanation,
although children understood why the inaccurate speakers
erred, the speakers’ history of accuracy or inaccuracy
was weighed more heavily when children were offered
generalizable, semantic knowledge. In contrast, when
offered epistemic knowledge, such as the (temporary)
content of a box, the risks of learning something false
might be less serious and children might take the less
cautious approach of excusing inaccuracy that occurred
due to temporary circumstances that no longer hold.
Further research could test this possibility by using
the same procedures for the two different types of
knowledge transfer. If  the suggestion is correct, then
when children are informed about the temporary content
of a container, they will excuse speakers’ explainable prior
inaccuracy with both the typical video procedure and
the interactive face-to-face procedure used by Nurmsoo
and Robinson (2007, March, 2007, October). In contrast,
when children are informed about the name or function
of a novel object, they will avoid learning from an inac-
curate speaker whatever the reason for the inaccuracy
when using the video procedure. On the other hand, if
the absence of normal communicative cues in the typical





the speaker erred (the second possibility
outlined above), then with that procedure they will focus
only on speakers’ accuracy or inaccuracy whether the
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